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From Warning to Wallpaper:
Why the Brain Habituates to Security Warnings
Anderson, B., Vance, A., Kirwan, B., Jenkins, J., Eargle, D. 2016. “From Warning to Wallpaper:
Why the Brain Habituates to Security Warnings and What Can Be Done about It,” Journal of
Management Information Systems, 33 (3), pp. 713–743,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07421222.2016.1243947.
Abstract
Warning messages are fundamental to users’ security interactions. Unfortunately, research has shown
that they are largely ineffective. A key contributor to this failure is habituation: decreased response to
a repeated warning. Previous research has inferred the occurrence of habituation to warnings or
measured it indirectly, such as through the proxy of a related behavior. Therefore, there is a gap in
our understanding of how habituation to security warnings develops in the brain. Without direct
measures of habituation, we are limited in designing warnings that can mitigate its effects.
In this study, we use neurophysiological measures to directly observe habituation as it occurs in the
brain and behaviorally. We also design a polymorphic warning artifact that repeatedly changes its
appearance in order to resist the effects of habituation. In an experiment using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI; n = 25), we found that our polymorphic warning was significantly more
resistant to habituation than were conventional warnings in regions of the brain related to attention.
In a second experiment (n = 80), we implemented the top four most resistant polymorphic warnings
in a realistic setting. Using mouse cursor tracking as a surrogate for attention to unobtrusively
measure habituation on participants’ personal computers, we found that polymorphic warnings
reduced habituation compared to conventional warnings. Together, our findings reveal the substantial
influence of neurobiology on users’ habituation to security warnings and security behavior in
general, and we offer our polymorphic warning design as an effective solution to practice.

Keywords: Security warnings, habituation, behavioral information systems security, functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), mouse cursor tracking, NeuroIS
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INTRODUCTION
Warning messages are one of the last lines of defense in computer security and are fundamental to
users’ security interactions with technology. Unfortunately, experimental research has consistently
shown that they are largely ineffective [25, 74]. This is problematic, as users are increasingly
targeted by attackers seeking to gain access to the information resources of organizations.
Consequently, researchers have actively sought to understand how users interact with security
warnings and why warnings are so pervasively ignored [9].
A key contributor to the disregard of security warnings is habituation, which is “decreased
response to repeated stimulation” [79, p. 419]. Through this phenomenon, warnings that were once
salient become virtually unnoticeable, like familiar wallpaper. Although habituation has been
inferred as a factor in many security-warning studies [e.g., 29, 68], little research has specifically
investigated habituation in the context of warnings. Further, because habituation is difficult to
directly observe using conventional methods, research that does investigate habituation has done so
indirectly by observing its influence on security-related behaviors rather than by measuring
habituation itself [e.g., 10, 12]. Therefore, there is a gap in our understanding of how habituation to
security warnings occurs in the brain, in addition to behavioral habituation. Without direct measures
of habituation, researchers are limited in their efforts to design warnings that can mitigate its effects.
This study addresses this gap by using NeuroIS—the use of neurophysiological tools to
explore how the functioning of the brain affects IS-related behaviors—to open the “black box” of the
brain [26] in order to observe habituation as it develops in response to security warnings. In doing so,
we respond to the call of Crossler et al. [18] for the application of NeuroIS methods to yield fresh
insights into information-security behaviors. Specifically, we point to the repetition suppression
effect, the reduction of neural responses to stimuli that are viewed repeatedly [36], as the neural
manifestation of habituation to stimuli [45]. We also draw on mouse cursor movement indicators of
attention as a behavioral–attentional manifestation of habituation to stimuli. By investigating
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behavioral–attentional indicators of habituation and how repetition suppression occurs in the brain,
we can take a more precise approach to the design of security warnings that are resistant to the
effects of habituation.
Accordingly, the research objective of this paper is twofold: (1) to directly observe
habituation as it occurs in the brain and is manifested in behavioral-attentional indicators using
neurophysiological tools, and, using these measures, (2) to design a security-warning artifact that is
substantially more resistant to habituation than were the conventional warnings. Our research
questions to pursue these objectives are:
RQ1. How does habituation occur in the brain in response to security warnings?
RQ2. How can security warnings be designed to be more resistant to habituation?
We investigated these questions in two laboratory experiments using complementary
neurophysiological measures: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Experiment 1) and
mouse cursor tracking (Experiment 2). This follows the guidance of Dimoka et al. that “no single
neurophysiological measure is usually sufficient on its own, and it is advisable to use many data
sources to triangulate across measures” [28, p. 694]. In Experiment 1, we designed a polymorphic
warning artifact that repeatedly changes its appearance as a means of sustaining attention. In doing
so, we made 12 graphical variations to the warning derived from findings in the warning science
literature [86]. Next, we performed an fMRI experiment to evaluate our polymorphic warning design
and found that it was substantially more resistant to habituation than were conventional warnings.
Further, we used the fMRI results to identify the graphical variations most resistant to habituation.
In Experiment 2, we implemented our polymorphic warning artifact in the Google Chrome
browser as part of a realistic task to enhance the ecological validity of our results. This study
explored how participants responded to Google Chrome permission warnings on their personal
laptops. In addition, we used mouse cursor tracking to measure changes in attention over time due to

3

habituation. We found that our polymorphic warning resulted in reduced habituation when compared
with the standard permission warning, corroborating the fMRI results of Experiment 1.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review the literature relating to
security warnings, habituation, and NeuroIS methods for measuring habituation. We then discuss the
hypotheses, experimental procedures, and analyses for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, we
present a general discussion of our findings for both experiments and summarize the implications.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Given its strong security implications, habituation is frequently cited as a key contributor to users’
failure to heed warnings [38, 61]. However, most studies infer the presence of habituation, rather
than empirically examine it. For example, Egelman et al. [29] found a correlation between user
disregard for warnings and user recognition of warnings as previously viewed, and attributed this
correlation to habituation. Akhawe and Felt found that the most common browser SSL error had the
lowest adherence rate and the shortest response time, and noted that this result was “indicative of
warning fatigue” [2, p. 268], in other words, habituation.
Those few studies that do empirically examine habituation to security warnings have done so
indirectly. For example, Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón [12] found that compared to
conventional warnings, a security warning that randomized the position of its option buttons resulted
in users ignoring the message less frequently in risky situations. Bravo-Lillo et al. [10] measured
habituation in terms of the percentage of users who immediately recognized that the contents of a
dialog message had changed after a rapid habituation period. Only 14 percent of the users in their
study immediately recognized the change in the dialog message.
From the studies reviewed above, it is clear that despite habituation to security warnings
being widely acknowledged as a problem, little empirical research has specifically examined this
area of information security. Moreover, the lack of direct measures of habituation limits our ability to
design security warnings that are resistant to habituation. Therefore, measuring the occurrence of
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habituation in the brain presents an opportunity to quantify the antecedents and onset of habituation
and its impacts on security-warning behavior. This is consistent with the recommendation of vom
Brocke and Liang [82], who emphasize the importance of selecting NeuroIS research questions that,
first and foremost, answer problems of importance to the IS community, and, secondly, benefit from
studies using neurophysiological measures. With this objective in mind, we next review the
application of NeuroIS to the study of behavioral information security.
In the brain, a diminished neural response to a repeated stimulus is called repetition
suppression, a robust manifestation of habituation, and has been observed in humans across a variety
of brain regions and experimental situations [for review, see 36, 69]. The exact cause of repetition
suppression may vary according to brain region. In the visual processing system—a brain network
highly relevant to the processing of visual warnings1—repetition suppression appears to be related to
repetition priming and may reflect the facilitation of stimulus processing with repeated exposures
[24]. This type of response is highly influenced by the similarity of the repeated stimuli, where a
more robust suppression is associated with stimuli that share a greater number of similarities [53].
Interestingly, research has found that neural measures of repetition suppression can be more
sensitive to habituation than behavioral measures are. For example, Motley and Kirwan [59]
demonstrated that the hippocampus differentiates subtle changes to stimuli (in this case, stimuli
rotated by 15°) even when participants’ behavioral responses indicate that they are unaware of the
changes. Therefore, research shows that the repetition suppression effect is an effective and sensitive
way to assess the underlying neural computational processes of behavior [e.g., 48, 87]. In this study,
we map the sensitivity of different brain regions to stimulus repetition of security warnings.

1

See http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/visual; https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_cortex.
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Mouse Cursor Tracking: A Behavioral–Attentional View of Habituation
Mouse cursor tracking has been proposed as a cost-effective and unobtrusive instrument to measure
users’ attention in an HCI context [e.g., 31, 60]. Mouse cursor movements can be used to “infer user
attention in complex web pages containing images, text and varied content” [60, p. 2693]. For
example, research has shown that eye-gaze and cursor movement patterns are highly correlated [20,
46]. Freeman et al. suggested that the movements of the hand “offer continuous streams of output
that can reveal ongoing dynamics of processing, potentially capturing the mind in motion with finegrained temporal sensitivity” [31, p. 1]. Accordingly, hundreds of recent studies have chosen mouse
cursor tracking as a methodology for studying various cognitive and emotional processes. See
Appendix C for examples of how mouse cursor tracking has been used to measure attention.
Importantly, mouse cursor tracking can measure changes in attention [60, 65] and therefore
can be used to measure diminished attention in response to repeated warnings, the form of
habituation relevant to our context [42]. Because mouse cursor tracking can be measured
unbeknownst to users on their own laptops (through JavaScript embedded in a website), it offers a
superior method for unobtrusively measuring habituation in users’ natural environments compared to
other methodologies (e.g., fMRI, eye tracking, EEG, etc.). In this paper, we use both fMRI and
mouse cursor tracking to provide a more holistic view of habituation to security warnings.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In this section, we first provide an overview of habituation theory that we will use to help support our
hypotheses. We then introduce our polymorphic warning design. Finally, we discuss two different
sets of hypotheses: fMRI hypotheses and mouse cursor tracking hypotheses. These hypotheses are
tested in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, respectively.
Overview of Habituation Theory
Two prominent complementary theories explain the process of habituation: the stimulus-model
comparator theory (SMCT) [73], and the dual-process theory DPT [37]. SMCT [73] claims that when
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people see a repeated stimulus, they form a mental model of the stimulus. As a new stimulus is
observed, people compare the incoming stimulus with the mental model. If the model and stimulus
are similar, the brain’s amplifying system inhibits the behavioral response, resulting in a response
decrement—an attenuation of the response. However, if the incoming stimulus does not match the
model, an orienting reflex occurs [5]. In this situation, the brain’s amplifying system will release the
inhibition and the response strength will increase.
DPT proposes that when people see a stimulus, one of two processes will occur: habituation
or sensitization [63]. When people encounter a stimulus, the brain compares the stimulus to any
existing mental representations of the stimulus. If the stimulus and a model are similar, the
habituation process occurs, resulting in a response decrement. However, if the stimulus is novel,
sensitization occurs, which counterbalances habituation and increases one’s response to the stimuli.
We draw on the common theoretical elements of the mental model comparisons to support our
hypotheses [80]. proposes that when people see a stimulus, one of two processes will occur:
habituation or sensitization [63]. When people encounter a stimulus, the brain compares the stimulus
to any existing mental representations of the stimulus. If the stimulus and a model are similar, the
habituation process occurs, resulting in a response decrement. However, if the stimulus is novel,
sensitization occurs, which counterbalances habituation and increases one’s response to the stimuli.
We draw on the common elements of both of these theories to support our hypotheses [80].
Polymorphic Warning Design
One of our research objectives was to design a security-warning artifact substantially more resistant
to habituation than conventional warnings. Several approaches have been suggested to increase
attention to security warnings and thus reduce habituation. For example, following design guidelines
found in the warning literature, Bravo-Lillo et al. [10, 11] designed and tested a variety of warning
attractors, which are graphical elements that draw attention to salient information in warning dialogs.
These studies demonstrated that habituation could be reduced through UI design.
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In a different approach, Wogalter stated that “habituation can occur even with well-designed
warnings, but better designed warnings with salient features can slow the habituation process. Where
feasible, changing the warning’s appearance may be useful in reinvigorating attention switch
previously lost because of habituation” [85, p. 55]. In line with this reasoning, Brustoloni and
Villamarín-Salomón [12] proposed polymorphic warnings, which change appearance to reduce
habituation. In contrast, warnings are typically static, meaning they do not change appearance on
repeated exposures. However, they only tested changing the order of options on the warning dialog,
acknowledging that “the design space for polymorphic dialogs is vast” [12, p. 4]. In addition, it is not
clear whether polymorphic warnings actually reduce habituation, as they did not measure habituation
directly. Thus, our research objectives are to (1) use fMRI to determine whether a polymorphic
warning design is able to reduce habituation in the brain in response to repeated warning exposures,
and (2) identify the polymorphic variations that are most successful at reducing habituation.
Development
We relied on the warning science literature to develop 12 graphical variations expected to capture
attention. Our polymorphic warning artifact rotated through the graphical variations on each
subsequent exposure. These variations are described in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1.
Table 1. Polymorphic variations and their support from the literature
Text Appearance
Color of text
Highlighting of text
Message Content
Pictorial symbols (e.g., an exclamation point)
Signal word (e.g., “warning” or “danger”)
Warning Appearance
Color
Contrast (e.g., white on black)
Ordering of options
Size
Animation
Jiggle, Scale/Zoom, Twirl/Spin

Support
Braun et al. [7], Laughery et al. [49]
Strawbridge [77], Young and Wogalter [88]
Support
Kalsher et al. [44], Sojourner and Wogalter [72]
Kalsher et al. [43], Silver and Wogalter [71]
Support
Braun and Silver [8], Rudin-Brown et al. [66]
Sanders and McCormick [67], Young [89]
Brustoloni and Villamarín-Salomón [12], De
Keukelaere et al. [22]
Vigilante and Wogalter [81], Wogalter and Vigilante
[84]
Support
Bravo-Lillo et al. [10], Furnell [32], Leung [50]
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(a) Original Warning Screenshot

(b) Color of Text Variation

(c) Highlight of Text Variation

(d) Signal Word Variation

(e) Pictorial Signals Variation

(f) Ordering of Options Variation

(g) Color Variation

(h) Size Variation (3X Larger)

(i) Contrast Variation

(j) Border Variation

(k) Twirl Animation Variation

(l) Scale/Zoom Animation Variation

(m) Jiggle Animation Variation

Figure 1. Polymorphic warning design variants.
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Experiment 1. Hypotheses
According to theory on habituation (see the section titled “Overview of Habituation Theory”), when
users repeatedly see a warning, they will generate a robust mental model of the warning across
exposures. On each successive exposure to the warning, users will rely more on the mental model of
the warning as opposed to the actual warning presented, resulting in a response decrement to the
actual warning [37, 73]. Accordingly, our first objective is to examine the nature of the repetition
suppression effect in neural responses when users view repeated presentations of security warning
stimuli. Once we establish the neural signature of habituation to security warnings in general, we will
be able to determine if polymorphic warnings deviate from the normal repetition suppression effect.
In a previous study [4], researchers observed robust repetition suppression across a number of
brain regions, most prominently in the visual processing system in response to repeated viewings of
static computer warning stimuli. Accordingly, in the present study we hypothesize:
H1: For static and polymorphic warnings, attention will decrease in terms of neural activation
across repeated exposures.
In the current study, we expect that the polymorphic warnings will maintain high levels of
attention across repetitions while static images will be associated with decreases in attentional
processing. This will be evident in a number of ways. First, we predict that polymorphic warnings
will be more resistant to repetition suppression than static images, especially in regions associated
with visual spatial attention (e.g., regions in the frontoparietal attention network) [16]. Second, we
predict that regions associated with inattention will be more active with repeated exposures to static
warnings when compared to polymorphic warnings. The default-mode network2 is a network of brain
regions that is more active when participants are allowed to rest and let their thoughts wander [13].
The default-mode network has been shown to be more active when participants are not attending to

2

http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/default; https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Default_mode_network.
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the presented stimulus [55]. If polymorphic stimuli are effective at maintaining participants’
attention, then default-mode network activity should be relatively low compared to activity for static
stimuli with repeated exposures. Accordingly, we expect that polymorphic warnings will be
associated with increased activity in attention networks and decrease activity in the default-mode
network, but static warning images will be associated with the opposite effect. The presence of an
interaction between stimulus repetition and stimulus type would indicate that polymorphic warnings
are more resistant to the repetition suppression effect than static warning images. Our hypothesis is
therefore:
H2: Attention will decrease in terms of neural activation less for polymorphic than for static
warnings across repeated exposures.
This will be evident in two ways: first, repeated presentations of static warnings will result in greater
decreases in activation in regions associated with attention compared to presentations of
polymorphic warnings. Second, repeated presentations of static warnings will result in greater
increases in activation in regions associated with inattention compared to presentations of
polymorphic warnings.
Finally, we expect that animated polymorphic warnings will exhibit a differential neural
response relative to still (non-animated) polymorphic warnings and will be more resistant to
habituation. This is because animation should activate regions of the brain associated with visual
motion processing, such as the human motion complex (hMT+) area3 [35], in addition to brain
regions that process the content of still images. Additionally, early visual processing areas, such as
the primary visual cortex, are responsive to motion [78]. Thus, animated polymorphic warnings
should exhibit an additive effect over that of still polymorphic warnings.

3

hMT+ or human middle temporal complex; http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/motion;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_modularity.
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H3: Attention will be greater in terms of neural activation for animated polymorphic warnings
than for non-animated polymorphic warnings.
In other words, there will be a higher neural response upon successive viewings for animated
polymorphic warnings as compared with non-animated polymorphic warnings in regions that
demonstrate repetition suppression, in addition to greater neural activation in motion-sensitive
regions, such as the hMT+.
Experiment 2. Hypotheses
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to test the findings of Experiment 1 in a more realistic context,
enhancing the ecological validity of the study as a whole using mouse cursor movements to measure
habituation. Mouse cursor movements can be used as an unobtrusive surrogate of users’ attention.
For example, mouse cursor movements are highly sensitive to stimuli and information that, even
briefly, capture users’ attention [60]. Attention can be measured through various movement statistics
including greater area under the curve, slower average speed, and slower initial acceleration (see
methodology section for a description of these statistics). This relationship between attention and
mouse cursor movements has been validated in various settings [e.g., 20, 83].
With repeated exposures to security warnings, users will rely more on the mental model of
the warning as opposed to the actual warning presented, resulting in a decreased response [37, 73].
This response decrement includes paying less attention to the warning, and responding to the
warnings more reactively and automatically, which will influence mouse cursor movements in
several ways. First, as information on the warning captures users’ attention less, mouse cursor
movements will deviate less toward that information [60], moving more directly to execute a learned
movement response—a predetermined movement response to the warning (e.g., dismissing the
warning) [70]. Further, when users rely on the mental model more as opposed to giving attention to
the warning, movements will reactively begin to execute the learned response, which results in faster
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acceleration and speed of movements [54, 70]. These mouse-movement indicators of lower attention
will amplify over repeated exposures to the warning—an indicator of habituation. In summary, we
hypothesize:
H4: For both static and polymorphic warnings, attention will decrease in terms of mouse
cursor movements (greater area under the curve, slower average speed, and slower initial
acceleration) across repeated exposures.
However, polymorphic warnings should garner more attention than static warnings in
general, resulting in higher mouse cursor movement indicators of attention for polymorphic
warnings. When a warning’s appearance is updated, this causes the warning to differ from the
existing mental model of warnings in general. As a result, users will experience an orientation reflex
that will cause them to pay more attention to the warning [73]. In other words, the novelty of the

warning causes sensitization that draws users’ attention to the warning [63]. This will result in
greater deviation of mouse cursor movements from directly responding to the warning as users
examine the different parts of the warning to determine what is new and view the warning’s
message [60]. Further, as users examine the warning, their movements will not reactively respond to
the warning as much, neither accelerating nor moving as quickly [54, 70]. In summary, we predict:
H5: Attention will be greater in terms of mouse cursor movements (greater area under the
curve, slower average speed, and slower initial acceleration) for polymorphic warnings than
for static warnings.
As users continue to see polymorphic warnings, they will also begin to habituate to them (see
H4) [84]. However, we hypothesize that this habituation will occur more slowly for polymorphic
warnings than for static warnings. By continually changing the appearance of the warning, the mental
model of the polymorphic warning will be less stable compare to the mental models of seeing
repeated static warnings. Thus, when users see a subsequent polymorphic warning, it is less likely to
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match its mental model, resulting in novelty and less habituation over time [73]. Further, as it

continues to change its appearance, the polymorphic warning will further conflict with its mental
model, causing sensitization that counters or slows habituation over time [63]. In summary, in
addition to polymorphic warnings garnering more attention in general (H5), we predict that the
decrease in attention due to habituation over time will be less for polymorphic warnings than for
static warnings:
H6: Attention will decrease less in terms of mouse cursor movements (greater area under the
curve, slower average speed, and slower initial acceleration) for polymorphic warnings than
for static warnings across repeated exposures.
METHODOLOGY
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two experiments. Experiment 1 tested the fMRI-related
hypotheses (H1–H3). Experiment 2 tested the mouse-tracking-related hypotheses (H4–H6). We will
now describe the methodology for each experiment.
Experiment 1: fMRI
Measures
Functional MRI is a method of choice in decision neuroscience because of its superior ability to
identify areas of the brain that are activated during decision making and other behavioral tasks [27,
64]. Although certain neurophysiological tools, such as EEG [21, 47, 51] or eye-tracking [57], offer
greater temporal resolution for examining habituation, these methods cannot examine activity in
specific brain regions as fMRI can. Functional MRI measures neural activity indirectly by tracking
changes in the level of blood oxygenation, which are driven by changes in the metabolic demands of
active neural populations. This phenomenon is known as the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
effect, and its magnitude is proportional to the degree of underlying neural activation [52]. By
measuring the BOLD effect, researchers can both identify distinct regions of the brain where activity

14

is correlated with specific emotions (e.g., fear or uncertainty) and cognitive processes (e.g.,
perception or memory retrieval), and evaluate the degree of activation in these regions. Thus, fMRI is
well suited to the investigation of the neural underpinnings of how habituation to security warnings
occurs in the brain.
Experimental Design
We used an event-related, within-subject experimental design in which we compared the
response to polymorphic warning images with the response to static warning images. Our
experimental design is graphically depicted in online Appendix A and consists of four steps for each
participant. In Step 1, we randomly split a pool of 40 warnings between a polymorphic and static
warning treatment. In Step 2, the warnings in the static treatment were repeated 13 times. For the
polymorphic treatment, warnings were also repeated 13 times, albeit that, with each repeated
exposure, a different polymorphic variation was displayed in random order. For example, the first
exposure of a polymorphic warning might have featured a red background, the second exposure
might have included a yellow-and-black striped border, and so on. The number 13 was chosen by
calculating the maximum number of polymorphic stimuli that we could show to participants while
not extending total scan time beyond estimated subject toleration limits of approximately 30 minutes.
To be parallel, we included 13 repetitions for static warnings as well. In Step 3, 40 images of general
software applications were randomly intermixed with the warning images and displayed one time
each. Trials in which these images were presented served as a baseline in the fMRI model.
Accordingly, deviations from baseline, or "0", in our fMRI parameter estimates represent deviations
from an active task condition (i.e., viewing images) rather than a passive rest condition. We chose
this condition as a baseline in order to keep participants engaged in the task and to avoid
unconstrained mental activity in the task [see 75]. There were a total of 560 images (20 polymorphic
warnings × 13 variations [for each of the polymorphic warnings] + 20 static warnings × 13
repetitions [identical, with no variation] + 40 software images × 1 exposure each) to be displayed in
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the experiment. Finally, in Step 4, the 560 images were randomized for each participant across five
blocks of 6.5 minutes each (with a 2-minute break in between) in order to relieve participants’ fatigue
during the tasks. This randomization ensured that any effects observed would be due to the
polymorphic treatment, rather than the appearance of the warnings themselves. Further, it ensured an
effective jitter between stimuli of similar types and avoided autocorrelation in the experimental
design [see 19]. For each stimulus, participants were shown images for 3 seconds each with a 0.5second interstimulus interval (ISI). Technical details of the fMRI scanner, experimental procedures,
and analyses are documented in online Appendix A.
Experimental Task
For each visually presented stimulus, participants used a keypad to indicate if the image shown was
(1) identical to one seen before the task, (2) similar yet different from one seen previously in the
task, or (3) new, never seen before in the task. This question was used to provide behavioral
performance data that ensured that participants were appropriately engaged in the task. Our
subsequent analysis of the responses (“identical,” “similar,” and “new”) to each stimulus type (novel,
static, and polymorphic manipulations) revealed that participants performed the task as expected. At
the conclusion of the fMRI scan, each participant was led to an adjoining room to complete a brief
post-test feedback survey. Additionally, to ensure manipulation validity [76], the post-test survey
included a manipulation check question that displayed a polymorphic warning as it rotated through
its variations. Each participant was asked if he or she noticed the treatment during the task. All but
one of the participants reported that they had noticed the experimental treatment, which indicated
successful overall manipulation. Following Straub et al., we elected to retain the participant who
reported that he was not manipulated to provide “a more robust testing of the hypotheses” [76, p.
408].
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Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited from the university community and were screened for MRI
compatibility. Additionally, we screened participants to require native English speakers, correctednormal visual acuity, and right-handedness and excluded those taking psychotropic medications or
with color blindness. Each participant signed an informed consent form in accordance with the IRB
protocol. Of the 25 participants, 21 were male and 4 were female. Participants were age 20–27, with
a mean of 23.68. We conducted a pilot study that revealed a large estimated effect size for the
repetition effect (partial eta2 = 0.7). Using this estimated effect size, an a priori power analysis
indicated that we would need four subjects to achieve power greater than 0.8, indicating that a
sample size of 25 is more than adequate [4].
Data Analysis
Our first research question centered on the effect of repetition on measures of neural activation.
Accordingly, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the whole-brain fMRI data with
repetition number and stimulus type (polymorphic, static) as factors. This allowed us to identify
those brain regions that (1) had differential responses to subsequent repetitions (i.e., that displayed a
main effect of repetition number in their neural responses as we hypothesized in H1) and (2) had
differential responses to subsequent repetitions that were modulated by stimulus type (i.e., that
displayed an interaction between repetition number and stimulus type as we hypothesized in H2).
Accordingly, for each brain region that displayed a main effect or an interaction (i.e., the regions of
interest, or ROIs), we extracted mean parameter estimates for all the voxels in the ROI to perform
follow-up repeated-measures analyses, such as examining the direction and strength of any linear
trends with repeated presentations.
In our first analysis, we identified 10 regions where there was a significant main effect of
repetition number (thresholded with a voxel-wise p < 0.001 and spatial extent > 40 contiguous
voxels; overall p < 0.001). These regions are listed in Table 2. Since these regions were defined as
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merely demonstrating a main effect of repetition (i.e., activity during at least two different repetitions
differed significantly from each other), we extracted mean parameter estimates from each region to
further characterize the nature of the neural responses over repeated stimulus presentations. As noted
in Table 2, each region demonstrated a significant linear trend, and in all but one region this linear
trend was negative. As an example, Figure 2 depicts the activations in the left and right middle
occipital gyrus and the change in activation on the right as a function of repeated stimulus exposures.
In regions associated with visual-spatial attention (i.e., left and right occipital lobe and superior
parietal lobule), there was a main effect of stimulus type, but no stimulus type by repetition
interaction. These findings are consistent with H1, which was that for both polymorphic and static
warning images, measures of neural activity would indicate decreased attention with repeated
exposures.
Table 2. Regions demonstrating a main effect of repetition and associated inferential statistics
Coordinates
Region
L. Dorsolateral Prefrontal
Cortex
R. Middle Occipital Gyrus

Main Effect
Stimulus
F(1,22)
p

#Voxels

x

y

z

512

50

-8

33

9.56

352

-29

89

12

B. Medial Frontal Gyrus

250

2

-17

L. Middle Occipital Gyrus

241

29

R. Fusiform Gyrus

190

L. Superior Parietal Lobule

Linear Trend Repetition
Direction

F(1,22)

p

.005

Negative

42.63

<.001

53.60

<.001

Negative

23.26

<.001

48

10.62

.004

Negative

37.75

<.001

89

18

26.57

<.001

Negative

32.68

<.001

-26

56

-4

27.62

<.001

Negative

25.90

<.001

153

35

59

54

24.99

<.001

Negative

24.23

<.001

R. Superior Parietal Lobule

98

-32

68

48

31.07

<.001

Negative

22.34

<.001

L. Fusiform Gyrus
R. Postcentral Gyrus
(ventral)
L. Postcentral Gyrus (dorsal)

71

32

50

-10

25.99

<.001

Negative

18.69

<.001

54

-56

26

15

3.59

.071

Positive

27.44

<.001

54

47

29

54

10.28

.004

Negative

16.63

<.001
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Figure 2. Example regions with fMRI activation changes with subsequent presentations of
polymorphic and static warning images. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.

Our next hypothesis concerned the interaction between stimulus repetition and warning type
(H2). Accordingly, we first performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the whole-brain fMRI data
with stimulus type (polymorphic, static) and repetition number as factors. We then performed
repeated-measures analyses of activations from each region of interest to test our hypotheses. In the
whole-brain analysis, we found four regions where there was a stimulus type × repetition number
interaction (Table 3), indicating that these regions reacted differently to repeated exposures to static
and polymorphic warnings. Two regions, the left and right superior parietal cortex (Figure 3, upper
panels), have been implicated in attentional processing [15]. We extracted mean parameter estimates
(betas) for these functionally defined regions of interest to further characterize the nature of the
interaction between warning type and repetition number using two-way repeated-measures ANOVAs
with warning type (static, polymorphic) and repetition number as factors. In these regions, activation
was significantly higher for polymorphic warnings than for static warnings, consistent with sustained
Table 3. Analysis results for warning type x repetition interaction
#Voxels
X
Ventral Medial Prefrontal
248
2
Left Retrosplenial
51
8
Left Superior Parietal
45
29
Right Superior Parietal
42
-38

Y
-59
53
62
50

Z
12
18
54
51
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attentional processing and reduced repetition suppression for the polymorphic warnings (main effect
of stimulus type, left: F[1,22] = 19.10, p < 0.001; right: F[1,22] = 22.69, p < 0.001).
Consistent with H2, there was sustained attentional processing for the polymorphic warnings
with later repetitions as evidenced by a significant repetition by stimulus type interaction on the left
(F(12,264) = 3.07, p < 0.001) and on the right (F(12,264) = 3.37, p < 0.001). The two other
significant regions, the bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the left retrosplenial cortex
(Figure 3, lower panels), have both been shown to be major nodes in the default-mode network [13].
In both regions, activation was higher for static images than for polymorphic images (main effect of
stimulus type, MPFC: F(1,22) = 21.54, p < 0.001; retrosplenial cortex: F(1,22) = 5.10, p < 0.001).
Critically, this difference in activation emerged in later repetitions, consistent with H2, predicting
that there would be a significant interaction between stimulus type and repetition number in the

Figure 3. fMRI activation changes with subsequent presentations of polymorphic and static warning
images. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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default-mode network (interaction, MPFC: F(12,264) = 3.92, p < 0.001; retrosplenial cortex:
F(12,264) = 3.39, p < 0.001). Thus, H2 was supported.
An alternate interpretation of these activations is that they reflect changes in risk perception
(e.g., [58]) and value processing (e.g., [6]) rather than changes in attentional processing. This
interpretation is especially compelling in the decreasing activation patterns in the superior parietal
cortex as habituation might make warnings appear less severe and thus less risky. If this
interpretation is correct, then the reduction in risk perception may be overcome by polymorphisms.
We offer this interpretation cautiously, however, as we did not explicitly manipulate risk nor did we
measure subjective risk or value perceptions.
We next performed an analysis to identify regions that exhibited BOLD activation
differences between animated and non-animated warnings across all voxels in the brain by
performing a t-test. Ten clusters were identified where activity significantly differed between these
conditions (see Table B1 in online Appendix B). Importantly, and consistent with our third
hypothesis (H3), we observed greater activation for animated warnings in the right area hMT+
(Figure B1 in online Appendix B), an area involved in visual motion processing (t(21) = 5.54, p <
0.001).
Finally, we examined the specific polymorphic warnings collapsing across presentation order
to determine which polymorphic variations were most resistant to the repetition suppression effect.
To quantify the most resistant variations for use in Experiment 2, we performed a t-test contrasting
polymorphic and static warning images. Resulting statistical parameter maps were thresholded using
a false-discovery rate of 0.05 and a spatial extent threshold of 1,080 mm3. The largest cluster of
activation comprised the bilateral visual processing system (including the occipital, dorsal parietal,
and inferior temporal lobes). The mean fMRI activations in this region of interest for each
polymorphic variation were then ranked (see Figure 4). The highest scoring variations (“jiggle,”
“scale,” “window color,” and “symbol”) were included in Experiment 2.
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Summary of Results
As expected, we found a decrease in neural activation in regions associated with visual-spatial
attention with repeated exposures to the warning stimuli (H1). Further, we found an interaction in
portions of the frontoparietal attention network where fMRI activation remained relatively consistent
for polymorphic warning images across repetitions while the activation for static warning images
decreased (H2). We also found regions in the medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex where
activation was higher for later repetitions of static images than for polymorphic images. These
additional regions have been commonly observed in the default-mode network, a network of regions
that are activated when participants are allowed to engage in non-directed mental activity [34].
Accordingly, this increased activation for later repetitions of the static images but not the
polymorphic images may indicate less inattention for the polymorphic images than for the static
images (H2).
The animated polymorphic warnings showed the greatest effect. By using animations such as
a slight jiggle or zoom upon the appearance of the warning, more brain regions were activated. This

Figure 4. Mean fMRI activation difference for each polymorphic warning variation
vs. the mean activation for the static warnings in the region that displayed the
greatest difference between polymorphic and static warning images. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean.
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was true not only in the traditional bilateral visual system associated with still images, but also in the
hMT+ region associated with moving images (H3). In summary, brain activity generally remained
higher across repetitions for the polymorphic warnings, supporting the efficacy of our polymorphic
warning artifact.
Experiment 2: Mouse Cursor Tracking
To improve the ecological validity beyond the limitations of fMRI, we designed a behavioral
laboratory experiment in which participants responded to security warnings in the natural course of
completing a task on their personal laptops. While users responded to security warnings, mouse
cursor movement data (i.e., how a person responded using the laptop touchpad) were collected
through embedded JavaScript and stored in an online database (see online Appendix C for a review
of mouse cursor tracking). Mouse tracking was used because of its completely unobtrusive nature to
enhance ecological validity—that is, mouse activity can be captured on users’ personal computers
without additional hardware, software, or configuration [40]. These data were analyzed to explore
whether users paid greater attention to the polymorphic warnings over time compared to the static
warnings. By using a second neurophysiological methodology, we triangulated the results of the
fMRI experiment in Experiment 1 [28].
Measures
We collected mouse cursor movements when the warning was displayed via embedded JavaScript to
calculate three indicators of attention: area-under-the-curve (AUC), initial acceleration, and average
speed. These measures are detailed in online Appendix E, and summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. Summary of mouse cursor indicators of attention/habituation
Indication of Attention / Habituation
AUC
Greater AUC = Greater Attention
Initial Acceleration
Lower Initial Acceleration = Greater Attention
Average Speed
Lower Average Speed = Greater Attention
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Experimental Design
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an experiment wherein participants responded to security
warnings in the natural course of completing a task on their personal laptops. We selected Google
Chrome extension permission warnings as the warning type. Extensions, also referred to as “addons” or “plug-ins,” add functionality to the web browser but often require access to data on the
computer to perform their functions. For this reason, whenever an extension is installed by a user,
Chrome displays a warning that alerts the user to the specific access that the extension requires [33].
For example, an extension that accesses an application-programming interface (API) to detect the
browser’s physical location must first raise the permission warning, “Add X (extension)? It can:
Detect your physical location.” During the course of the experiment, participants were required to
search for and install 20 simulated weather extensions and then evaluate them for usability and
aesthetics. Because a permission warning is displayed whenever a Google extension is installed, the
participants also received 20 permission warnings. In this way, participants were naturally habituated
while completing the task.
We implemented a repeated-measure (participants evaluated 20 simulated weather
extensions), between-subject experimental design. Participants were randomly assigned to the
polymorphic warning treatment or the static warning treatment (a between-subject manipulation)
group. The polymorphic treatment group received polymorphic warnings that changed appearance
from one exposure to the next. The control group received conventional Google Chrome permission
warnings that were static, meaning they did not change appearance. The warnings are shown in
online Appendix D.
Experimental Task
The experiment took place in a behavioral laboratory. To heighten perceived risk, participants were
asked to use their personal laptop and were required to read the following disclaimer: “The
researchers have not tested all possible weather extensions that you may encounter. The university is

24

not responsible for any potential malicious software that may be installed as a result of this study.
Each participant has the responsibility to use good judgment in deciding which extensions to install
and evaluate.” Furthermore, to motivate users to read the warnings, we randomly varied which
permissions were being requested in each warning.
Next, participants were asked to use Chrome and search Google.com to find 20 different
weather extensions and evaluate them for (1) ease of use, (2) visual appeal, (3) relevancy of content,
and (4) their intention to use the extension in the future. However, we performed a man-in-themiddle attack to manipulate the Google search results. If a query related to Chrome weather
extensions was shown, the search returned our spoofed results. Each of the links in the spoofed
results pointed to sites under our control with legitimate URLs. Our Chrome extension transparently
redirected HTTPS traffic to HTTP to avoid SSL4 certificate errors. Finally, we caused traffic to the
Chrome Web Store to redirect to a “down for maintenance” page. Consequently, participants were
required to use the in-line Chrome extension installation process on individual web sites (for
technical details of Experiment 2, see online Appendix F).
The manipulated Google search results included more than 40 different weather extensions.
Participants were required to evaluate only 20 of these. If a participant received a permission warning
requesting unreasonable permissions, the participant was free not to install the extension. Participants
had ample time to go back to the Google search results to find an alternative extension.
While responding to each warning, an embedded JavaScript library in the warning captured
the users’ cursor movements (the timestamp and x-, y-coordinate of each movement at a millisecond
precision rate). These raw cursor movement data were sent to an online database through the
Asynchronous JavaScript and eXtensible markup language (AJAX) call and were later used to

4
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calculate the dependent variables for each observation: AUC, initial acceleration, and average speed
(calculations are discussed in the Analysis section).
After evaluating 20 extensions and finishing the experiment, each participant completed a
post-test survey. The survey captured information about the participant’s gender, age, operating
system, the browser normally used, and the usual frequency of extension installations. It also asked
whether the participant noticed anything unusual about the Domain Name Server (DNS) (a result of
our manipulated search results) and queried the participant’s perceived risk of ignoring security
warnings, perceived severity of being infected by malware, and perceived susceptibility to malware
infection for inclusion as control variables in the analysis. Per the approved IRB protocol, all
participants were then debriefed, notified of the true purpose of the experiment (exploring the
influence of security warnings and habituation on behavior), and told that all of the extensions were
sanctioned and did not gather any personal information.
Participants
Eighty subjects participated in the final version of the study. The participants were allowed to visit
and revisit a website during the course of the experiment to view the warning for that website’s
browser extension again. The system recorded if a person tried to reinstall an extension for inclusion
in the analysis. As a result, each participant on average encountered slightly more than 20 warnings
(exactly 21.2). For the analysis, data were limited to the first 20 warnings for each participant
because the number of observations per repetition beyond 20 was too small for reliable analysis (per
the instructions, most participants stopped at 20). Because participants were required to use their own
laptops, technical limitations on a few of the laptops inhibited data collection through JavaScript. As
a result, we had analyzable data from 76 participants across 1,466 warnings (40 in the treatment
group and 36 in the control group). An a priori power analysis calculated with G*Power 3.1.7
suggested that a sample size of 1,073 observations was adequate for a small effect size and that 111
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics for AUC, average speed, and initial acceleration (raw
data was rescaled and transformed)
Mean
SD
Min
Max
AUC
Polymorphic
1.556
4.714
0.488
10.000
Static
0.511
0.514
0.134
6.410
Initial Acceleration
Polymorphic
4.017e-05
3.698e-05
1.740e-07 2.330e-04
Static
8.048e-05
8.802e-05
3.800e-07 6.370e-04
Average Speed
Polymorphic
8.620e-04
1.049e-03
7.430e-05 1.670e-02
Static
1.524e-03
1.589e-03
6.610e-05 1.729e-02

was adequate for a medium effect size. Thus, our sample size was more than adequate.
Approximately 63 percent of the participants were male, and the average age was 22.35.
Data Analysis
The Lowess curve [14] for the resulting statistics (AUC, initial acceleration, and average speed) was
plotted for each treatment across time (see Figure 5). The descriptive statistics for each mousemovement are displayed in Table 5. We first performed a check for manipulation validity. To explore
whether the polymorphic warnings were perceived, we asked participants, “During the experiment,
did you notice that some of the warnings changed their appearance like the above image?” (The
polymorphic warning rotating through its variations was shown). None of the participants in the
control group reported “yes,” and 95 percent of the participants in the treatment group reported
“yes.” This difference was significant in an independent sample t-test: t(74) = 25.807, p < 0.001.

Figure 5. Lowess curve of AUC, average speed, and initial acceleration by order (solid
line = polymorphic warning, dotted line = static warning)
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After preparing the data and conducting the manipulation checks, we specified a multivariate
general linear model to test the hypotheses. The model featured three dependent variables: AUC,
acceleration, and speed for each observation (n = 1,466). Based on the Lowess curves, we logtransformed these dependent variables to form linear relationships. We included several independent
variables. First, we included the warning order number to model habituation across multiple warning
exposures, and we included the treatment group to represent polymorphic (coded as 1) and static
(coded as 0) conditions. To explore the interaction between habituation and treatments, we included
an interaction term for treatment × order. Next, we controlled for the participant identifier to allow
variability across participants. This accounts for other individual differences that may influence
mouse cursor movements. Finally, we controlled for whether the warning was being reinstalled
(coded as 1) or being installed for the first time (coded as 0)5. The results are shown in Table 6. The
r2 for AUC was 0.095, for initial acceleration was 0.224, and for average speed was 0.132.
As a supplemental analysis, we performed a graded motor response analysis [20] in the time course
of participants responding to security warnings (see online Appendix G). In summary, this analysis
allows us to explore how much users deviated from the idealized response trajectory throughout their
response, rather than just an aggregated measure of total deviation at the end, which is the case with
AUC. Thus, this supplemental analysis lends understanding in terms of whether warning information
sustains greater attention throughout the movement for polymorphic warnings than for static
warnings. For brevity, the analysis and results are described in online Appendix E. In summary,
corroborating the findings described above regarding AUC, the results of the supplementary analysis
provide strong support that deviation was greater for participants in the polymorphic treatment than
for participants in the static warning treatment almost throughout the entire movement interaction.

5

As participants were allowed to complete the task naturally for ecological validity, they could potentially revisit
websites, reinstall extensions, and see the warning for those extensions again.
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Table 6. Experiment 2 results
Dependent
Variables
AUC
AUC
AUC
AUC
AUC
AUC
Initial Acceleration
Initial Acceleration
Initial Acceleration
Initial Acceleration
Initial Acceleration
Initial Acceleration
Average Speed
Average Speed
Average Speed
Average Speed
Average Speed
Average Speed

Independent
Variables
(Intercept)
Treatment
Order
isReinstalled
Treatment*Order
Participant
(Intercept)
Treatment
Order
isReinstalled
Treatment*Order
Participant
(Intercept)
Treatment
Order
isReinstalled
Treatment*Order
Participant

Parameter
Estimate
0.001
0.967
-0.053
0.689
0.028
a
3.512e-05
-3.782e-6
4.882e-06
5.364e-05
-3.782e-06
a
0.001
-0.001
7.528e-05
0.001
-4.064e-05
a

F
300.434 (1, 1362)
64.728 (1, 1362)
14.474 (1,1362)
7.991 (1, 1362)
32.133 (1, 1362)
1.041 (79, 1362)
1354.441 (1, 1362)
156.188 (1, 1362)
136.552 (1, 1362)
59.235 (1, 1362)
9.289 (1, 1362)
1.746 (79, 1362)
1275.828 (1, 1362)
93.289 (1, 1362)
83.262 (1, 1362)
25.129 (1, 1362)
18.072 (1, 1362)
1.450 (79, 1362)

p
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.01
< 0.001
< 0.01
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.01
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
> 0.05

a Each participant id has its own parameter estimate, adjusting for natural individual differences in mouse movement
between participants

Summary of Results
The results of the analyses support the hypotheses. The warning order number had a strong negative
correlation with AUC (p < 0.001), positive correlation with initial acceleration (p < 0.001), and
positive correlation with average speed (p < 0.001). As habituation increased with subsequent
exposures (i.e., with warning order number), H4 was supported for all three indicators. The results
also indicated that the use of polymorphic warnings increases AUC (p < 0.001), decreases initial
acceleration (p < 0.001), and decreases average speed (p < 0.001), suggesting that users habituate
less when polymorphic warnings are shown (H5 supported for all three indicators). In addition, the
results suggest that users habituate at a slower rate when polymorphic warnings are shown. The
interactions between treatment and order were significant for AUC (p < 0.001), initial acceleration (p
< 0.01), and average speed (p < 0.001) (H5 supported for all three indicators).
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DISCUSSION
This research makes several contributions, which we summarize below.
Contributions of Experiment 1: fMRI experiment—Polymorphic VS. Static Warnings
First, in Experiment 1, we extended previous research on habituation by using neuroscience methods
to observe the neural correlates of habituation as it occurs. While previous research has understood
habituation as an automatic response, our research is the first to show empirically how habituation to
security warnings occurs in the brain. In doing so, we identified the phenomenon of repetition
suppression as a neurobiological explanation for why habituation to security warnings occurs.
Additionally, this study demonstrated an application of measuring the repetition suppression
in the brain using fMRI. Whereas previous research measured habituation indirectly by observing its
effects, such as inattentive behaviors [10], this study measured neural correlates of habituation
directly as it occurs in the brain. Specifically, we showed how using a simple, repeated-exposure
experimental design can permit researchers to detect the existence and size of the repetition
suppression effect using the BOLD response. Using this method, we illustrated the continued drop in
activation in the frontoparietal attention network for static images, but sustained activation for
polymorphic images over 13 exposures. These results can provide researchers with a useful baseline
of the repetition suppression effect in response to security warnings for future research. Further, these
measures may be used to guide the development and testing of security warnings that are resistant to
habituation and, thus, lead to safer behavior.
Second, we made an artifactual contribution by designing (in Experiment 1) and
implementing (in Experiment 2) a polymorphic warning as a UI artifact. We utilized the warning
science literature to derive 12 polymorphic variations that can be generically applied to a wide
variety of security warnings. Whereas scholars have criticized IS research for the frequent absence of
the IT artifact [3, 62], our polymorphic warning UI design artifact is central to our contribution.
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Importantly, we analyzed the fMRI data to improve the UI artifact by identifying the
polymorphic variations that were most effective in reducing repetition suppression. In this way, we
followed the guidance of Dimoka et al., who suggested that “rather than relying on perceptual
evaluations of IT artifacts, the brain areas associated with the desired effects can be used as an
objective dependent variable in which the IT artifacts will be designed to affect” [26, p. 700, p. 700].
By using repetition suppression in the brain as our objective dependent variable, we were able to
simplify the polymorphic warning to include only the top four most effective variations, including
animated and non-animated forms, making our polymorphic warning more practical to implement.
Third, we demonstrated in Experiment 1 that polymorphic warnings are more resistant to
repetition suppression than are static warnings. We theorized that this is because animated warnings
activate areas of the brain that perceive motion (hMT+), providing an additive effect over and above
the visual processing of non-animated images. Unsurprisingly, of our 12 polymorphic warnings, the
two most resistant to repetition suppression were animated (“jiggle” and “scale”).
Contributions of Experiment 2: Mouse Cursor-Tracking Behavioral Experiment—
Polymorphic vs. Static Warnings
In Experiment 2, we made a methodological contribution by providing three mouse cursor-tracking
indicators of decreasing attention and therefore habituation: AUC, initial acceleration, and average
speed. Whereas fMRI is considered costly and labor intensive and requires a high level of specialized
expertise [28], our mouse cursor-tracking measures are inexpensive to implement and can be mass
deployed. Moreover, fMRI necessarily introduces artificiality into an experimental task because of
the requirements of the technology (e.g., the fMRI machine is loud, and participants must perform
the task lying down). In contrast, the mouse cursor-tracking measures are unobtrusive to the user and
may be deployed in web-based tasks simply by including a JavaScript file within standard web
pages. Further, it can be deployed without any special hardware or processes (e.g., an eye tracker and
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a configuration process) that may induce artificiality. Thus, our mouse cursor-tracking measures
provide behavioral security researchers with a powerful technique to assess user habituation.
Second, the results of the mouse cursor-tracking behavioral experiment corroborated the
fMRI findings of Experiment 1. Specifically, we found that polymorphic warnings resulted in both
lower habituation (as evidenced by the main effect) and reduced habituation (as indicated by the
interaction effect of the polymorphic treatment and the warning display order) than did static
warnings. Using two complimentary neurophysiological measures allowed us to validate the results
of both techniques, as well as to compensate for weaknesses inherent in each method.
Overall Contributions
Finally, our findings highlight the usefulness of applying NeuroIS to the domain of behavioral
information security. Because automatic or unconscious mental processes underlie much of human
cognition and decision making [26], they likely play an important role in a number of other security
behaviors. Therefore, our research points to promising new research directions for behavioral
information security in general.
Implications for Theory and Practice
Although users are frequently cited by security researchers as careless and inattentive [39], our
results show that at least part of this behavior is obligatory and unconscious as a natural consequence
of how the brain works. Our findings thus add to the chorus that users are not the enemy [1]. These
results also illustrate that users, in addition to having to defend against malicious actors and software,
must battle their own biology. Future research should investigate other obligatory, unconscious, or
automatic behaviors that undermine the information security of individuals and organizations.
NeuroIS methods are uniquely qualified to examine such behaviors because of their ability to
observe phenomena beneath the cognition of the user [28].
Our findings have important implications for practice in the development of interventions to
reduce habituation to security warnings. Rather than relying only on interventions such as SETA
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programs, which encourage greater attention and vigilance [46], our results suggest that an effective
complementary measure is to develop UI design artifacts that target repetition suppression in the
brain, such as the polymorphic warning tested in this study. Rather than requiring explanations and
training that can require hours, our polymorphic artifact elicits positive effects in milliseconds.
Importantly, in providing this benefit, the polymorphic warning artifact presented in this
study is unobtrusive and imposes no additional cost to the user. In contrast, other techniques for
curbing habituation, such as imposing a time delay on security warnings before they can be
dismissed [10, 12], impose a cost on the user that can be considerable over time and when aggregated
over a large workforce or populace [39]. Further, our polymorphic warning artifact is simple and
cost-effective to implement and can be implemented in virtually any kind of system.
Limitations and Future Research
This research is subject to a number of limitations. First, both experiments used laboratory
experiments that necessarily introduced artificiality into their tasks. In particular, current technology
limits the flexibility and realism of experimental tasks. Fortunately, these problems in the fMRI
Experiment 1 were at least partially compensated for by Experiment 2, wherein participants
conducted a more ecologically valid task. Additionally, the object of laboratory experimentation is to
maximize precision and control, not external validity [23, 56]. We therefore leave to future research
to apply field methodologies that can achieve greater levels of external validity.
Second, both experiments in this study were cross-sectional. Although we observed that our
polymorphic warning was more resistant to habituation than static warnings in our experiment, it’s
possible that the effectiveness of the polymorphic may decline overtime. Further research is needed
to test the effectiveness of the polymorphic warning longitudinally.
Third, although frequently cited as a problem [17], habituation is not the only factor
influencing the failure of users to heed security warnings. Other factors worthy of examination
include the urgency of the task at hand [41], lack of comprehension of the warning message [85], or

33

conscientious decisions to ignore the warnings for a variety of reasons [30, 39]. We welcome further
research on the multifaceted problem of security-warning disregard.
CONCLUSION
User habituation to security warnings has long been a point of concern in the area of information
security [9]. In past research, habituation has been attributed to user carelessness, inattention, and
ineptitude [39]. In contrast, we demonstrate in this study that habituation is largely obligatory, as a
result of the way the brain processes familiar visual stimuli. A chief implication of our results is that,
because habituation occurs unconsciously at the neurobiological level, interventions designed to
encourage greater attention and vigilance on the part of users, such as SETA programs, are
incomplete on their own. Our findings suggest that a complementary solution is to develop UI
designs that are less susceptible to habituation. The polymorphic warning artifact developed in this
study is one such effective design. Accordingly, our study supports the development of more
complete theories of security behavior that take into account the biology of the user and provide
useful neurophysiological measures to guide the design of habituation-resistant warnings.
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